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The Future of the Administrative Presidency:
Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out
SIDNEY

A.

SHAPIRO*

&

RONALD

F.

WRIGHT"

All realistic study of government has to start with an understanding
of bureaucracy .

.

. because no government can function without it.

The popular antithesis between bureaucracy and democracy is an oratorical slogan, which endangers the future of democracy. For a constitutional system which cannot function effectively, which cannot
act with dispatch and strength, cannot live.
-Carl Friedrich'
The central question [concerning bureaucracy is] how adaptation is to
occur so that the public is served in a more efficacious way and that
would-be reformers are not permitted to destroy an institution that
remains central to the functioning of democracy.
-Ezra Suleiman 2
Despite endless rantings to the contrary, American bureaucracy does
work-in fact, it works quite well.
-Charles T. Goodsell'
President Obama has adopted the same approach to controlling the
federal bureaucracy that his predecessors employed, dating back to the
Reagan administration: the administrative presidency. The administrative presidency seeks to rein in bureaucratic discretion by centralizing
decision-making in the White House and by sending vast numbers of
political appointees into the agencies to monitor and control the bureaucrats. Beset by two wars and the Great Recession, it is not surprising that
the President has chosen, at least so far, not to change this approach to
agency oversight. But the choice is unfortunate. The capacity of the regulatory agencies has deteriorated over the years to the point that they are
*
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largely dysfunctional.' The administrative presidency has played a role
in this demise.
The administrative presidency, along with congressional oversight
and judicial review, are efforts to control bureaucratic discretion from
outside of the agencies, an approach we call "outside-in" accountability.
Administrative law scholarship focuses almost exclusively on these
external controls.6 Meanwhile, public administration scholars discuss the
potential of promoting accountable and effective government from
inside the bureaucracy, using managerial controls, and building up
expertise and professionalism.' This approach we describe as "insideout" accountability.
The outside-in strategy builds on the presumption that civil servants
consistently act in self-interested ways, a presumption that is not borne
out empirically. There is plenty of evidence that other-regarding motives
oftentimes guide the actions of public employees, reducing the likelihood that they will misuse administrative discretion. Based on this
insight, we contend that democracies can, under the right conditions,
depend on inside-out controls to complement outside-in controls and
promote accountability.
There are two challenges involved in making this strategy a reality.
First, we need to identify the conditions that make inside-out control
most likely to succeed and identify the agencies that best fulfill those
conditions. Second, we must redesign those governmental institutions to
take advantage of the expertise and other-regarding motives of civil servants. Unfortunately, the administrative presidency crowds out the better
instincts of civil servants, leaving us with less effective and less responsive government. An over-reliance on external controls does real harm:
it reduces the capacity of the civil service to provide expert advice,
which is unfortunate because bureaucratic expertise serves as a check on
short-term thinking and the politicization of public policy by the White
House.
Our argument for a more balanced approach to the problem of
bureaucratic discretion proceeds in four steps. Section I briefly describes
the two outside-in approaches and the two inside-out approaches that
might address the problem of administrative discretion. Each of the four
approaches promotes democratic accountability (and thus addresses the
4. See

RENA STEINZOR &

SIDNEY SHAPIRO,

THE

PEOPLE'S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE

To

PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS To HEALTH,
SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
regulatory agencies).

5. See infra Section IV.B.
6. See infra Section Ill.A.
7. See infra Section l.B.

4-5 (2010) (describing the dysfunctional state of five major
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legitimacy questions that surround the work of unelected bureaucrats),
yet each approach also carries major limitations.
Section II proposes a model of bureaucratic behavior that lays out
ideal conditions for the use of inside-out controls. Once we see that
inside-out controls are promising for some agencies but not for others,
the question becomes what is the best mix of inside-out and outside-in
approaches. We argue that agency employees are more likely to perform
in a public-interested manner when they have less discretion in how they
perform their jobs (because they are subject to detailed instructions) and
when they are easily monitored. We also suggest that professional training and traditions among bureaucrats, other things being equal, will
make inside-out controls more effective.
Section III surveys the theoretical and empirical accounts of
bureaucratic behavior, and evaluates our model in light of that evidence.
While the legal and political science literatures view bureaucrats as primarily self-interested, the public administration literature views them as
primarily other-regarding. Although we find that there is considerable
evidence to support this second view, our model avoids the need to
choose between these two views, by recognizing that employees hold
both self-interested and other-regarding motives. By treating self-interested and other-regarding motivates as distinct, something that the competing public choice model does not do, our approach allows
government reform and redesign to respond to empirical learning.
Section IV reviews the origins of the administrative presidency.
Then we describe the features of the administrative presidency that blunt
the effects of expertise and professionalism, even in agencies where
those features could produce an effective inside-out control. We contend
that the tools of the administrative presidency are used too frequently
and argue that the mix should be readjusted to give greater emphasis in
some agencies to inside-out approaches, particularly professionalism.
Our aim is to kick-start a discussion of governmental accountability
and effectiveness that recognizes the rich reality of bureaucratic behavior. Civil servants are not the threat to democracy or government effectiveness that politicians and economic theorists portray them to be.
Instead, when properly trained and supervised, government employees
have significant potential to promote democratically responsive government. This does not mean that external controls should be ignored, or
should not be strengthened, but it does mean we should design bureaucratic controls that do not squelch this potential inside the agency.

I.

RESPONSES To ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

When Congress passes regulatory legislation, it normally delegates

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
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policy-making discretion to agencies through the use of vague and
ambiguous language.' This is the political cement that creates legislative
majorities when disagreements about the details loom as a potential
roadblock.' Congress also recognizes that agencies usually bring to the
table greater expertise, experience, and organizational capabilities, such
as fact-finding, than Congress can muster. 10 Whatever the motivation,
this delegation presents a serious legitimacy problem: How can we
ensure the democratic responsiveness of the unelected administrative
bureaucracy?
In 1903, Bruce Wyman drew a distinction between external and
internal administrative practice, a distinction that has defined the boundary line between administrative law and public administration scholarship ever since." Thus, with only a few exceptions, most prominently
Jerry Mashaw,12 administrative law scholars treat agencies as a black
box to be controlled from the outside, using political oversight and judicial review. The possibility that something is going on inside the agency
that contributes to democratic accountability is never seriously considered." Public administration scholars, by comparison, have been discussing the potential of promoting accountable and effective government
from inside the bureaucracy since the earliest works in that discipline.14
These scholars have focused on two strategies: managerial controls from
the top of the agency and building up expertise and professionalism
throughout the agency."
Accounting for both of these literatures, as Figure I indicates, we
sort the methods of promoting democratic accountability in administrative agencies into four categories." Political oversight and judicial
review constitute "outside-in" approaches, while bureaucratic controls
and professionalism constitute "inside-out" approaches.
8. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY
AND PROCESS § 3.1 (5th ed. 2009).

A.

SHAPIRO & PAUL

R.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. BRUCE

VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

wYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 1-23 (1903).
12. See JERRY L. MASHAW,
DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983).

BUREAUCRATIC

JUSTICE:

LAW

MANAGING

GOVERNING

SOCIAL

THE

SECURITY

13. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of

Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 486-87 (2002) (stating that administrative law
treats inside the agency as a black box).
14. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Section III.B.2.
16. See Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector:
Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 227, 227-30 (1987) (identifying the

four accountability systems).
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Figure 1: Institutional Controls of Discretion
Inside-Out
Outside-In
Political
Bureaucratic
(Overhead Democracy)
(Hierarchical Authority)
Judicial Review
Professionalism
(Impartial Competence)
(Transmission Belt)
This section describes how each approach works in theory to promote democratic accountability. We also consider the major weaknesses
of each approach, although we will have more to say about some of
these limitations in later sections.
A.

Political Oversight

Political oversight establishes what Emmette Redford described in
1969 as "overhead democracy."" The public chooses its leaders in competitive elections. They assume office with the power and responsibility
to enact and execute policy, including overseeing the bureaucracy. Successful leaders are rewarded with reelection, thereby ratifying their
actions, including the oversight of agencies. Unsuccessful leaders, by
comparison, will be replaced.' 8
Both Congress and the president engage in political oversight, but
the administrative presidency has become the focal point of political
oversight, in part due to perceived weaknesses in congressional
oversight.
1. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Ideally, Congress would oversee the administrative agencies routinely and systematically, but there are few political incentives for mem-

bers to spend their time in this manner." Even without routine oversight
hearings, Congress can still influence agency decision-making because
interest groups inform members of Congress about potential problems.20

The political science literature suggests that together, these forms of
17. See EMMETrE

S.

REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 70 (Roscoe

C.

Martin ed., 1969) (arguing that overhead democracy legitimates agency government).
18. See KENNETH J. MEIER & LAURENCE J. O'TOOLE, JR., BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRATIC
STATE: A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 6 (2006) (describing the operation of overhead democracy).
19. See JOEL ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLIrrCS OF CONGRESSIONAL

OVERSIGHT 102 (1990); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutionaland Political Theory in

Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 482-83 (1985); Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro,
Politicaland Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1175, 1201 (1981).

20. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA.

L. REV. 431, 444 (1989).
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oversight-the routine "police patrol" efforts along with the "fire alarm"
responses to particular crises-give Congress sufficient information to
bring agencies to heel if they stray too far outside of legislative policy
preferences.2 1
Nevertheless, there are obvious limitations to the reach of these legislative controls. Congressional radar does not pick up many administrative decisions.2 2 Even when informed, Congress may ignore the protests
of interest groups that legislators do not favor. The Republican majority
in Congress failed to investigate agency failure during the Bush administration, for example, despite considerable evidence that agencies were
failing to carry out their statutory missions.23
There is also a question of whether the oversight itself is democratic. Committees conduct the oversight hearings, and individual legislators sometimes dominate those hearings. The individuals most
interested in the oversight questions may not represent the policy preferences of a majority of members. Legislators often seek committee
assignments to benefit special interests in their district or state, and other
members may have no control over the signals that the legislature sends
to the agency.24 Consider, for example, the use of appropriations riders
buried in large appropriations bills, a tactic that effectively hides the
policy decision from the rest of the Congress except the sponsor and
21. See, e.g., David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control of
Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2205-08 (2010) (describing how "scholars

have returned their focus to Congress as a legitimizing force"); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional
Administration, 43 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 61, 121 (2006) (describing the "potent" formal tools
Congress often uses to conduct extensive oversight of the executive branch, as well as "pervasive
and persistent" informal methods through which Congress keeps a watchful eye); Matthew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, CongressionalOversight Overlooked: Police Patrol Versus Fire

Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166-76 (1984) (detailing the misconception that congressional
oversight through a combination of limited police-patrol and thorough fire-alarm oversight is
insufficient).
22. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big PictureApproach to PresidentialInfluence on Agency Policy-

Making, 80 IoWA L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (asserting effective monitoring of agency action involves
day-to-day awareness and collection of "voluminous quantities" of technical information); Steven
Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L.

REv. 821, 834 (2003) (stating that the "informational capture" thesis assumes Congress does not
have the ability to monitor agencies and cannot "discipline" them for failing to favor
congressional will).
23. See Press Release, U.S. H.R. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Bush Labor Department Failed to
Properly Investigate Wage Theft, GAO Tells House Panel (Mar. 25, 2009), http://edlabor.house.
gov/newsroom/2009/03/bush-labor-department-failed-t.shtml; see also Susan Milligan, Congress
Reduces Its Oversight Role: Since Clinton, a Change in Focus, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 20,

2005), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/ll/20/congress-reducesits.oversightrole/.
24. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 2212; see also Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of
Accountability and PoliticalReview of Agency Rules, 51 DuKE L.J. 1059, 1077 (2001); Sidney A.
Shapiro, PoliticalOversight and the Deteriorationof Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 15

(1994).
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perhaps a few other legislators.2 5
2.

THE PRESIDENT

The administrative presidency relies on three interrelated strategies
to assert control over the bureaucracy. Presidents have tried to centralize
decision-making power in the White House by increasing the size of the
White House staff responsible for overseeing the agencies. 26 They have
also extended their influence over agency work by increasing the number of presidential appointees located in departments and agencies. 2 7
Finally, the White House has imposed reporting requirements, such as
regulatory impact statements, to enhance its monitoring and control
efforts.2 8
Supporters of the administrative presidency believe it compensates
for defects in congressional oversight.29 They contend that, unlike members of Congress, the President has a national constituency, making
White House oversight less parochial.3 0 Presidential oversight is also
considered to be more systematic, since agencies are required to submit
all significant regulations and all administrative guidance for review to
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), located in the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 1 And the White House, like
Congress, hears from interest groups that call potential problems to its
attention.3 2 Finally, although Congress can punish agencies that ignore
its wishes through devices such as appropriations riders, it is thought
that the White House can directly assert control through an extensive
network of presidential appointees who are chosen for their political loyalty to the President.33
Despite these advantages, there are also limitations to White House
oversight. It is not broad enough to review the thousands of regulatory
decisions that occur each year.3 4 And, despite systematic reporting
requirements, the White House acts non-systematically, choosing its
25. Beermann, supra note 21, at 88-89; Shapiro, supra note 24, at 14.
26. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2275-77 (2001)
(describing the increasing power and size of the White House after the Brownlow Committee).
27. See infra notes 136, 139 and accompanying text.
28. Kagan, supra note 26, at 2277-79.
29. Id. at 2347-48.
30. Id. at 2334, 2349.
31. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
32. See Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 46; see also Croley, supra note 22, at 882 (both articles
discuss the potential for interest groups to raise objections to the OIRA).
33. See infra Section IV.
34. STEINZOR & SHiPRo, supra note 4, at 129-32; Cynthia Farina, False Comfort and
Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 357, 397-98 (2010).

35. See infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
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targets on the basis of whether some office in the White House has a
particular interest in the matter or whether an interest group important to
the White House or some competing government agency opposes a proposed policy. 6 Finally, it is the White House staff that seeks to align
agency decisions with presidential preferences, not the President
himself.17
Finally, and more broadly, it is unlikely that most voters are aware
of the White House's efforts to superintend the administrative state, and
it is therefore unlikely that this affects their voting." Even if aware,
voters must make a wholesale choice when they vote for president, factoring in how they evaluate the president on a wide variety of issues.
Thus, even if voters are unhappy with some aspects of presidential
supervision of the administrative state, this will only sway their votes in
exceptional circumstances.3
B.

Judicial Review

Richard Stewart memorably portrayed the legal system as a "transmission belt" for legislative directives.4 0 An agency decision that is both
authorized by and rationally connected to the agency's statutory mandate is democratic in the sense that the Congress passes a law, the President signs it, and the agency implements the law.4 1 The function of
judicial review is to monitor the connections in this process. Judges
determine whether or not an agency has chosen a policy that is within its
legal and policy discretion, and whether an agency has followed applicable administrative procedures.
Judicial review, however, is an imperfect means of democratic
accountability. Placing unelected judges with lifetime tenure in charge
of ensuring the democratic responsiveness of the administrative state
opens the door for an unaccountable use of power.4 2 Recognizing this
36. Farina, supra note 34, at 416.
37. Id. at 408.
38. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 130; Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 19-20; Nina A.
Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MicH. L. REv.
1127, 1160-61 (2010) (calling for greater public disclosure of presidential influence on particular
agency decisions).
39. This last condition does occur, however. Many supporters of President Obama were
reacting to what they regarded as excessive politicization of regulatory policy in the Bush
administration. See Stuart Shapiro, The Fate of Bush's Regulatory Reforms, REG., Spring 2009, at
22, 27 (stating that "[m]any of Bush's changes have been widely derided by the interest groups
that supported Obama's election," and further noting the small cost of eliminating these changes).
40. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Lw, 88 HARv. L. REv.
1669, 1675 (1975).
41. Id. at 1675-76.
42. STEINZOR & SHAPIRo, supra note 4, at 146-69 (discussing the potential for judicial bias,
motivating incentives, and ideological judging).
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potential, administrative law doctrines, such as Chevron4 3 or rationality
review," ask judges to ensure the legal and policy rationality of administrative action without displacing agencies as the primary decision-makers concerning factual and policy decisions. This aspiration to judicial
modesty sometimes fails, however, because imprecise judicial review
doctrines permit judges to influence the outcome of administrative
action on the basis of their ideological and policy preferences.45 Recent
empirical work confirms the real-world impact of this theoretical
threat.46
We do not disagree with Steven Croley that judicial review and the
administrative law system provide a substantial check on the administrative state. 47 Our point is that, like the other methods of promoting democratic accountability, judicial review is flawed.
C.

Bureaucratic Control

Bureaucratic control uses managerial supervision of standard operating procedures or clearly stated internal rules. Managers issue detailed
instructions to employees about how to resolve issues or problems they
will face, and then monitor the behavior of their employees to ensure
that they follow these procedures.4 8 Using this system, agency managers
can ensure that employees do not implement policies outside of the
agency's legal discretion to act. More to the point, this system aligns the
behavior of agency employees with the policy preferences of the political appointees who run the agency. It therefore relies on hierarchical
authority to produce democratic responsiveness.4 9
Jerry Mashaw's examination of Social Security disability adjudica43. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). In
Chevron, the Court established a method of interpreting statutes that defers to the agency's
interpretation in instances in which Congress's intent is not clear. Id. at 863. Since judges are to
accept the agency's interpretation if it is a plausible one, the judge's role is to ensure the
reasonableness of the agency's interpretation, but not to substitute the judge's preferred outcome
for it. Id. at 844.
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (authorizing courts to reverse agency decisions that are
"arbitrary and capricious"). Since courts are not authorized to reverse non-arbitrary agency
decisions, the judge's role is limited to determining whether or not the agency has met this
minimum standard of rationality.
45. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Depoliticizing Judicial Review in Administrative
Law: Three Improbable Ways Forward (Sept. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
University of Miami Law Review).
46. See id. at 9-12 (describing the empirical scholarship).
47. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
REGULATORY GovERNMENT 99-101 (2008).
48. Romzek & Dubnick, supra note 16, at 228.

49. Id. at 229; Edward L. Rubin, Discretionand Its Discontents, 72 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1299,
1304 (1997).
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tion illustrates these benefits at work.so The Social Security Administration (SSA) employs a decision-making grid that indicates how to treat
disability benefit applications once the agency's employees determine
some basic facts." Mashaw finds that this grid, along with additional
managerial controls, promotes decision-making accuracy and consistency far better than judicial review could accomplish.5 2 His work therefore suggests that bureaucraticcontrols are an important way to deliver
democratic accountability.
Hierarchical controls only work if agency managers are effective at
using the tools available to them. If managers fail to issue standard operating instructions, fail to monitor compliance with them, or both, hierarchical controls will fail. Unfortunately, the Mineral Mining Service,
whose utter failure to regulate offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico
contributed to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, illustrates what can happen when agency employees are badly managed in this manner.54
Even if managers are not negligent, hierarchical controls may not
be entirely effective. Some agency activities lend themselves to specific
and standard operating procedures, while others do not. Think of the
differences, for example, between enforcement inspections and rulemaking. Agencies develop elaborate inspection manuals to guide the safety
inspector in the field who faces certain types of violations, 6 and agency
managers review the citations that each inspector issues to ensure that
the inspectors have followed their instructions.
It is not possible, by comparison, to pre-program the development
of a proposed regulation in the same manner. While agency managers
may give general instructions to the team, there is no equivalent of an
inspection manual or similarly detailed instructions for rule drafters.
Instead, administrators manage rulemaking through reporting requirements and meetings with the team of employees as they develop a
regulation.
50.

JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS:

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM

A

STUDY OF THE

49-120 (1978).

51. Id. at 19-33.

52. Id. at 146-50.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Siobhan Hughes & Stephen Power, Salazar Says Regulatory Oversight of

Industry Is Lax, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703
957904575252130658458208.html?KEYWORDS=siobhan+hughes+stephen+power.
55. See infra Section II.
56. See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS
MANUAL (2009).
57. See, e.g., Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of
EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVT. L. 683, 695-96 (1988)

(discussing the EPA's enforcement methods).
58. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking,

LAW

& CONTEMP.
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The same type of problem exists in a criminal prosecutor's office,
such as the office of a District Attorney or the Attorney General. Managers normally do not issue detailed, step-by-step instructions about how
attorneys should try a case or argue an appeal. Trial judgment and tactics
depend on an intimate knowledge of a particular case, and it is not possible to write more than general guidelines concerning these decisions.
Instead, as in rulemaking, managers in prosecutors' offices use a system
of reporting requirements and meetings to enforce the general policies
that line attorneys must implement in particular cases.59
In both the rulemaking and the criminal prosecution contexts, there
is an information asymmetry. Managers must depend on their employees
to furnish them with the information that they will use to engage in such
management. Because of this information asymmetry, institutional analysts distrust hierarchical controls (such as reporting and meetings) in
these contexts. 60 These limits on the reach of bureaucratic controls
become a rationale for creating multiple levels of political appointees in
an agency. By putting such employees in a closer relationship with
agency staff and their work, this tactic is supposed to reduce the typical
information asymmetries.6 1
As we take up in the next section, the potential for staff capture of
managers through the control of information is overstated because it
fails to account for professionalism. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
managerial controls do not work as well where managers must cede discretion to the career staff and where it is difficult to monitor how that
discretion is used.62
D.

Professionalism

Managers can also influence employee behavior by creating and
maintaining an. organizational culture that promotes a mission orientation, a sense of public service, and professionalism. 63 Public administration scholars have recognized the significance of organizational culture
as a management tool since the publication of Herbert Kaufman's book,
The Forest Ranger, in 1960.64
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57, 74-76 (describing how EPA managers use reporting and meetings to
direct rulemaking).
59. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 134 (2008)
(discussing recording and monitoring procedures for the prosecutor's office in New Orleans).
60. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
62. Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of

Judicial Review, 70 OHIo ST. L.J. 251, 270 (2009).
63. Romzek & Dubnik, supra note 16, at 229.
64. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A

STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (RFF
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Professionalism creates "neutral competence" because civil servants are constrained by their training, socialization, and peer relationships to think beyond the political values of the current White House. 5
Professionals act on a body of data and information external to the
agency. As they do so, they employ a methodology that they have been
taught to value.6 6 Peers reinforce this socialization when they expect that
a person within the agency will engage in appropriate professional
behavior. 67 A professional staff promotes democratic responsiveness by
identifying for the agency's political leaders the scientific, policy, and
legal options that are the most consistent with its legal mandate.
Analysts have made too much out of the accountability problem
posed by information asymmetries because they have failed to take into
account the role that professionalism plays in these contexts.6 8 When
agency employees act based on professional skills and loyalties, they do
not try to hide information from their managers, or skew it in some manner, because to do so would be unprofessional. Lawyers who act professionally, for example, will impartially present to their client-the
agency manager-the information that she or he needs to decide on a
course of action. 69 Other agency professionals perform in a similar manner. Scientists, for example, present an impartial reading of the evidence
available to them, because this is what their professional training and
self-identity dictate. Peer expectations within the scientific community
reinforce these traits.
Like the other forms of accountability, professionalism has its limitations. Analysis can be colored by the analyst's policy preferences, a
result made more likely by the uncertainty that is ever present in law and
science.7 0 Professionalism sometimes gives way to other motivations, as
John Yoo's "torture memo" illustrates. Yoo produced the memo for Jay
Bybee, the head of the Office of Legal Council (OLC) in the Justice
Department. The Office held a reputation for the independence and
Press 2006) (1960); see also, Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do: How To Deal with the
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 24-25 (2009).
65. See Herbert Kaufman, Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration, 50
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1057, 1060 (1956) (The "core value" in the search for "neutral competence" is
the "ability to do the work of government expertly, and to do it according to explicit, objective
standards rather than to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties.").
66. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOvERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
Do IT59-65 (1989).
67. Id.; Seidenfeld, supra note 62, at 277.
68. See infra Section H.B.
69.
70.
lawyers
71.

Seidenfeld, supra note 62, at 277-78.
WILSON, supra note 66, at 61 (noting how policy preferences influence the behavior of
and economists).
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY. LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH

ADMINISTRATION 142 (2007).
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professionalism of its work.7 2 This long tradition, however, failed to prevent Bybee and Yoo from looking primarily to the immediate political
and legal needs of their client, the White House.7
II.

A

MODEL

To

IDENTIFY PROMISING INSIDE-OuT AGENCIES

Each of the four methods of agency control operates to some extent
in the real world of federal administrative agencies. Some of those methods presume that bureaucrats act on the basis of self-interest, while
others assume that other-regarding reasons motivate the bureaucrats. We
believe that both accounts hold some truth, each within its proper
sphere. What we need, therefore, is a model of public employee behavior that identifies when self-interested and other-regarding behavior is
most likely to appear.
It is possible to avoid the effort to sort out the agencies into different categories by using only the outside-in controls and assuming that
self-interest dominates the work of all bureaucrats. When other-regarding motives of civil servants appear, one might treat them as a specialized form of self-interest." If an employee acts in a public-interested
manner, according to this approach, it is because the employee gains
more utility from this behavior than by acting in a self-interested manner. The difficulty is that this prediction about employee behavior cannot be falsified. Employees will act in their self-interest to gain material
advantages except when they act in their self-interest to gain non-material advantages.
We believe it is more fruitful to recognize that employees hold both
self-interested and other-regarding motives, to treat these motivations as
distinct, and to identify what factors may influence them to act in one
manner or the other. By treating self-interested and other-regarding
motivates as distinct, this approach allows testing for what factors influence public employees to act in one manner or the other. This section
proposes a model to accomplish this end. In our model, employee
behavior is influenced by the extent to which hierarchical controls and
72. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336-37 (2006).
73. Id. at 2336 (describing the authors of the memo as "a pep squad masquerading as a quasijudge"); David A. Harris, Review Essay, How the Commander in Chief Power Swallowed the Rest
of the Constitution, CPD. JUST. Ermcs, Summer/Fall 2007, at 44, 45 (asserting that Yoo acted
"with a willingness to say anything necessary for the administration to have its way.").
74. See, e.g., William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groups and the Courts, 6
GEO. MASON L. REV. 953, 963 (1998) (explaining that utility, or non-material well-being, can be
characterized as self-interested or public-oriented motivation such as the desire to do a good job or
to benefit society).
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professionalism are present in the agency to encourage employees to act
in the public interest.
A.

HierarchicalControls

Standard operating procedures or clearly stated internal rules can
limit the choices of agency employees and define the job in detail; these
internal controls set more narrow boundaries than the relevant statutes
require. Hierarchical controls therefore align the behavior of agency
employees with the policy preferences of the political appointees who
run the agency.7
Managerial controls are not viable for every function in every
agency. The availability of such controls depends on two factors. First,
is an agency able to formulate detailed instructions for employees on
how to perform their jobs? Some jobs lend themselves to such instructions more easily than others." All other things being equal, the more
detailed the instructions, the more likely it is that agency managers can
align employees' behavior with the goals of the agency.
Second, is an agency able to monitor employees' performance to
determine how well the employees adhere to the instructions they were
given?" All other things being equal, the extent to which an agency can
monitor employee performance, the more likely it is that agency managers can align employees' behavior with the goals of the agency.
Our model predicts that employees are more likely to perform in a
pubic-interested manner to the extent employees have less discretion in
how they perform their jobs (because they are subject to detailed instructions) and to the extent that they are easily monitored (to determine
whether they act according to those instructions). Figure 2 below illustrates these relationships. At the top left-hand corner of the figure, the
potential for public-interested behavior is at its maximum because
employees have no discretion and are completely monitored. The Social
Security Administration's disability program, discussed earlier," would
be located near the upper left corner of the diagram.
At locations lower and farther to the right side of the figure, as
employees gain more discretion and as monitoring becomes less effective, the potential for self-interested behavior increases. The vertical axis
of the diagram depicts the amount of monitoring that an agency performs. Programs located in the lower regions of the figure perform less
monitoring of agency employees, either because the legal, physical, or
75. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
77. See Seidenfeld, supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78. See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 50, at 49-120.
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organizational environments make the monitoring difficult, or because
the agency simply foregoes monitoring that is possible.
The horizontal axis of Figure 2 deals with the amount of discretion
that is available to agency employees, apart from any efforts by the
agency to monitor and control employee choices. The agency's organic
statute might leave relatively broad questions for agency employees to
answer as they implement the law. The nature of the work assigned to
some employees might also be complex or otherwise difficult to standardize, necessarily leaving some discretion in how to accomplish the
tasks. Agency functions that meet these descriptions would be located
further to the right on the diagram.
Figure 2: Impact of Monitoring and Discretion
Discretion

More

Less
More

Public Interest
Behavior
..

Self-Interested

Behavior
..................

Less
The vertical and horizontal dimensions of the figure interact. Some
agency functions might involve low levels of monitoring, while the level
of complexity and discretion inherent in the agency's delegated task is
also relatively low. Such functions would appear nearer to the lower lefthand quadrant of the diagram. Certain determinations of immigration
status might match this description;7 9 the same might be said of workplace safety inspections.so
By the same token, some agency activities could involve large
amounts of complexity and discretion, while the agency subjects its
employees to high levels of monitoring. These functions would be
depicted nearer the upper right-hand quadrant of the diagram. In the
79. For a discussion of the prospects for heavier monitoring of immigration adjudications, see
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STN. L. REv. 295 (2007); Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an
Administrative Law Context: The Dijd Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60

L. REV. 475 (2007).
80. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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offices of criminal prosecutors, certain high-priority categories of
crimes, such as domestic violence or homicide, meet this description,
because the work of line prosecutors receives more than the typical
amount of review by the office leadership, despite the complex judgments involved in preparing a major criminal case for a jury trial."
One of the key functions of federal administrative agencies is the
development of rules to implement the statutory mandate of the agency.
This notice-and-comment rulemaking poses special challenges for
accountability. Because this is non-routine work involving considerable
creativity and discretion on the part of employees, agency managers find
it difficult to issue detailed instructions in advance concerning how to
write a proposed rule.8 2 While agency managers routinely monitor such
behavior, the lack of standard operating procedures or clearly stated
internal rules makes monitoring more challenging.83 As an initial matter,
we would therefore place rulemaking outside of the dotted lines, in the
lower right-hand corner of the diagram, indicating that the potential for
self-interested behavior is relatively strong. Because the most expensive
and salient rules receive the heaviest review within an agency, those
rulemaking efforts might be located somewhat higher on the diagram. At
the same time, such high-impact rules also tend to involve technically
complex questions, thus pushing them further to the right on the
diagram.
The difficulty of monitoring the rulemaking functions of an agency
might indicate, as a preliminary matter, that outside-in controls are the
only way to make rulemaking agencies accountable. But this conclusion
ignores the potential of professionalism, the other inside-out approach.
As we develop next, some agencies have the capacity to create a strong
culture of professionalism, which provides meaningful protection
against self-interested behavior, and reduces the need for outside-in
actions.
B.

Professionalism

Professionalism creates impartial competence. The civil servant's
training, socialization, and peer relationships all combine to constrain
the person's actions on the job. Professionals act on a body of data and
standards of evaluation that are external to the agency. As they do so,
they employ a methodology that they have been trained and socialized to
81. For a discussion of the effects of more centralized control of criminal prosecution by the
leadership in larger prosecutor's offices, see Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/
Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STN. L. REv. 29 (2002).
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
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use. Peers reinforce this socialization when they expect that a person
will engage in appropriate professional behavior and punish those who
depart from accepted standards.8 4
Figure 3: Impact of Professionalism
Discretion
More
Less
More

Public Interest
Behavior
*'

Self-Interested
Behavior

..
.. ............

Less

Professionalism

Professionalization can make up for weaknesses in managerial controls, as Figure 3 illustrates. If employees have substantial discretion and
are not easily monitored, their behavior will tend to fall in the zone of
self-interest. But, when those same employees are highly professionalized, this approach shifts the workplace into the zone of public-interested behavior, as the arrows indicate.
Professionalism shifts the location of an agency function higher and
farther left on the diagram than the nature of the work initially indicates.
The shift to the left (reducing the range of discretion and complexity
built into the work) occurs because the training and expectations of a
profession make the nature of the work more predictable and less subject
to the choices of the individual employee. Tasks assigned to a lawyer
will be accomplished in a lawyerly manner, and tasks assigned to an
economist or an engineer will be completed in ways that comport with
the standards of basic competence for those professions.
Professionalism also shifts the location of agency work toward the
top of the diagram (increasing the effects of monitoring) because it
makes viable a wider range of monitoring for two reasons. First, professionalism reduces the problem of asymmetrical information. Professionals have been trained to deliver information according to the
standards of their profession, rather than to slant the information in some
manner in order to attempt to capture the policy process.85 Second, even
84. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
85. See HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING & MANAGING

PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONs

304-05

594

4 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:577

when no standardized data output is available for a manager to review an
employee's results, monitoring is still possible. Briefings by professional staff about ongoing and completed projects will be easier for a
manager to understand and evaluate if professional norms guide those
briefings.
Herbert Kaufman's classic work on the Forest Service illustrates
how professionalism makes up for weaknesses in hierarchical controls. 8 6
The management of federal lands is a multi-dimensional task, and the
far-flung physical locations of Forest Service offices made it difficult to
monitor the work of the rangers before modem advances in communication. These characteristics of the work delegated to the agency would
place it far to the right and the bottom of Figure 2. Concerned that these
job characteristics would produce inconsistent policies and possible corruption, Gilbert Pinchot, the first director of the Forest Service, made
two changes to the typical design of a governmental agency. First, he
required exceptionally detailed reporting from the rangers in the field
offices. Second, he set out to build an organization composed of professional foresters by developing an educational program, using
uniforms and other visible symbols of loyalty to external standards, and
emphasizing peer reinforcement of professional obligations.87 These
efforts produced what Kaufman called "voluntary conformity" to the
goals and public purposes of the Forrest Service." Kaufman found
"almost no charges of administrative sabotage by frustrated leaders, for
example; comparative few accusations of local favoritism and discrimination by the clientele of the national forests; [and] no discoveries by
Congressional investigators of scandalous field collusion with special
interests .

".8..
"9

The completed model accounts for an interaction between the
agency's work and the agency's workers. While the vertical and horizontal axes of Figure 3 capture aspects of the work delegated to the
agency and the efforts of the organization to monitor the execution of
those tasks, the diagonal force portrayed in the diagram-professionalism-focuses on qualities of the workers themselves. When workers are

(Jossey-Bass, 4th ed. 2009) (hallmarks of professionalism include a "code of conduct and
emphasis on adherence to it" and a "feeling of ethical obligation to render service to clients
without self-interest and with emotional neutrality"); see also id. at 305-06 (professionals in the
Reagan administration disagreed with many of its policies but regarded it as their professional
obligation to discharge those policies effectively).
86. See KAUFMAN, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 85.
88. Id. at 198.
89. Id. at 204.
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highly professionalized, we can expect them to act more often to protect
the public interest, rather than their self-interest.
Not all agencies will have the necessary degree of professionalism
to promote public-interested behavior. Just as managers can build a culture of professionalism, as Pinchot did, they can subvert it as well, as our
earlier example involving the Yoo memorandum on torture illustrates.9 o
We do not contend that professionalism is the silver bullet of democratic
accountability. But taking professionalism into consideration, civil servants are not the threat to democratic accountability that public choice
theory predicts, even in circumstances where they have considerable discretion and are difficult to monitor.
III.

THE

MOTIVATIONS OF

PUBLic

EMPLOYEES

As we discussed in Section I, two methods of promoting democratic responsiveness in administrative agencies work from the insideout, while two others work from the outside-in. All four methods have
important limitations, suggesting a strategy of using each method in the
most promising contexts. The model presented in Part II embraces the
idea of sorting the strategies into their most compatible agency environments. Yet the doctrine and practice of administrative law in the United
States has emphasized the outside-in methods embodied in administrative presidency-to the detriment of the inside-out approaches.
This inattention to inside-out strategies can be attributed to the
economic perspective that dominates the legal and political science literatures. In this model, the bureaucracy cannot be trusted because government employees are rational utility-maximizing actors who seek, first
and foremost, to further their own self-interests.
Many public administration scholars argue for an alternative view
of the motives of civil servants. They understand pubic employees to
have both self-interested and other-regarding motives, and they argue
that these other-regarding motives provide a source of protection against
the misuse of administrative discretion.
This section compares these two perspectives on the behavior of
public employees. We explore here the theoretical underpinnings of the
different accounts of bureaucratic behavior, along with the empirical
evidence that tends to support each group of theories. We then conclude
that there is substantial evidence to support the public administrative
perspective that public employees can be trusted, at least in some contexts, to act in the public interest. The theory and the available evidence
suggest that it is worthwhile for us to identify agencies that can create
90. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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strong conditions for public-interested behavior. The use of inside-out
controls in those settings can produce major benefits for the public.
A.

Economic and PoliticalScience Analysis

Economic analysis of public institutions provides two perspectives
that dispute the reliability of government employees to serve in the public interest. Public choice economics starts with an assumption that
bureaucrats are self-interested, which leads to a prediction that government employees will make decisions that advance their own careers and
interests.9 1 These interests include prospects for employment outside the
government, promotion within the government, the accretion of power,
and other self-interested goals, such as avoiding hard work (i.e., to shirk
rather than work). 92
Institutional economics posits that government managers do not
have the same array of tools that private sector principals can use to
align the interests of a principal and agents. Public managers cannot
readily induce productive behavior through financial incentives and they
cannot easily deter unproductive behavior by disciplining or firing
employees.9 3 As a result, the public manager can neither easily encourage work nor deter shirking and sabotage.
The problem of sabotage arises when government employees fail to
carry out an administration's marching orders, either because the
employees prefer leisure (a form of shirking) or because they oppose the
administration's preferences on policy or ideological grounds." At the
start of the Reagan administration, for example, the White House was
concerned that employees at agencies such as the EPA would sabotage
the administration's deregulatory goals because they were perceived to
be Democrats and persons who were committed to the agency's mission
of protecting the environment.
91. Steven J. Eagle, Economic Salvation in a Restive Age: The Demandfor Secular Salvation
Has Not Abated, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 569, 574 (2006) ("Public choice theory posits that

legislators, executive branch officials, and agency administrators are in business for themselves;
that is, they are motivated by the same types of incentives that motivate their counterparts in the
private sector.").
92. SULEIMAN, supra note 2, at 30 (describing the view of bureaucracy based on the economic
model in which government employees are self-interested).
93. JOHN BREHM & Scorr GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC
RESPONSE IN A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 42 (1999) (there is substantial evidence that coercive
supervision, particularly in the form of punishment, is limited); RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D.
LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTrrUTIONAL CHANGE 164-65 (1994) (demonstrating that
government managers are constrained by the civil service laws, which not only limit their capacity
to sanction poor workers, but impede their ability to reward good ones).
94. BREHM & GATES, supra note 93, at 21; Seidenfeld, supra note 62, at 280.
95. See MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS

AND
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Institutional economics also focuses on the difficulty that public
managers, like their private counterparts, have in monitoring employees
when the employees control the information that the managers need to
assess performance." Employees may filter information to protect themselves from being fired for poor performance, but they may also do so to
prevent an administrator from adopting policies that they oppose.97
The political science literature is varied, but the theoretical center
of gravity in that discipline also stresses the possibilities for self-interested behavior by government employees." Political scientists stress the
effects of interactions among different organizations. The historical concerns of the discipline emphasize the need for external controls of public
actors.
Thus, economic and political science theories of government agencies support the necessity of outside-in controls. Outside-in approaches
are necessary because civil servants will pursue their self-interest, which
may not coincide with the aims of the White House (or Congress), while
agency managers are constrained from deterring such behavior or even
recognizing when it happens.
B.

Public Administration Analysis

The public administration literature emphasizes how bureaucratic
controls, organizational culture, and professionalism ensure the democratic accountability of agencies. This potential was first recognized in
the Progressive Era and it continues to be recognized today, although
public administration theorists have modified their account of how
inside-out controls work.
1. A "SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION"
The original Progressives believed that government through administrative agencies would be effective because employees would be hired
on the basis of their expertise, rather than political patronage, and the
application of expertise would point the way to solutions for social
problems. Agencies would be efficient because, as bureaucracies, they
could be organized by the rational distribution of specialized functions
combined with a scientific plan for the flow of work.99 Agencies would
be neutral because, as Woodrow Wilson famously explained, the
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 109-26 (2000) (detailing the efforts of the Reagan

administration to control the bureaucracy at the EPA).
96. BREHM & GATES, supra note 93, at 13.

97. GERALD GARVEY, FACING THE BUREAUCRACY:
29-30 (1993).
98. See, e.g., GORDON TULLUCK, THE POLITICS OF
99. GARVEY, supra note 97, at 2-3.

LIVING AND DYING IN A PUBLIC AGENCY

BUREAUCRACY (1965).
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Progressives would establish a "science of administration" that operated
"outside the proper sphere of politics."1'"
The Progressives' concept of neutral administration was based on
three interrelated ideas. First, the government would hire employees
because of their demonstrated mastery of a technical skill or intellectual
discipline.'o Second, the administration of the laws only involved a
choice of the best way to implement a policy, making it possible to leave
the choice of policies to the political system. Once the political system
made a policy choice, employees would neutrally and impartially find
the best methods to implement that choice.102 Finally, imbued with a
professional's standard of performance, these civil servants would not
engage in political behavior because to do so would contradict their
training, their personal preferences, and their professional ethics. 0 3
Today, we know that the idea of a "science of administration" is
not feasible. The political system delegates to agencies many of the policy choices that the Progressives expected legislators to make. '0 Moreover, the Progressives were simply wrong that there would be an
objective solution concerning how best to implement a policy once it is
determined.10 But public administrators have not given up on the potential of neutral competence and professionalism to promote democratic
accountability.
2.

MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The public administration account of employee behavior sees civil
servants as having both other-regarding and self-interested motiva0 Employees reject self-interested action because of their dedications.o'
tion to public service, commitment to the agency's mission, and, as the
Progressives suggested, because of their professional training and orientation."0 ' The propensity of employees to engage in other-regarding
behavior is reinforced by the similar behavior of fellow employees and
by the mutual commitment of employees to the mission of the agency. 0 8
If an agency therefore maintains an organizational culture of professionalism and public service, public administration scholars predict employ100. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCi. Q. 197-98, 210 (1887).
101. GARVEY, supra note 97, at 20-21.
102. Id. at 22
103. Id. at 20-21.
104. Id. at 24-25.
105. Sidney A. Shapiro, "Political" Science: Regulatory Science After the Bush
Administration, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 31, 34-35 (2009).
106. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND
DEMOCRACY: AcCoUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 41-42 (2d ed. 2008).
107. See GOLDEN, supra note 95, at 21, 29.
108. Id. at 25.
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ees will engage in work rather than in shirking and sabotage."
Thus, by comparison to the economic perspective, many public
administration scholars see the civil service as a generally dependable
workforce rather than a significant threat to agency effectiveness and
democratic government. The same holds true for the sociological perspective on government agencies, embodied in organization theory.
Organizational sociologists emphasize the ways that the leadership and
internal structure of an organization shapes the behavior of individual
employees."o Together, the public administration and organizational
sociology scholars regard organizational culture and professionalism as
one method of promoting democratically responsive government along
with managerial and external controls.
C.

The Evidence

The public administration literature offers substantial evidence for
its more nuanced view of the behavior of public employees. First, government quite often works as it was intended, an unexpected development in light of economic theory. Second, despite public opinion polling
that indicates distrust of government, most Americans have had positive
encounters with government. Finally, survey evidence indicates that
most public employees have strong other-regarding motives.
1.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

The economic perspective paints a grim picture of government.
Employees act in their self-interest and managers have few options to
deter such behavior when it does not contribute to the mission of the
government."' If this description were accurate, we would expect government to fail at most of what it does.
Yet, every day, government does what it is supposed to do, whether
it is predicting the weather, running an insurance program such as Medicaid, or ensuring that the money supply is not counterfeit. As for the
regulatory agencies, they produce regulations, run inspection programs,
and enforce the statutes and regulations, suggesting that their employees
are doing the work of government, or at least that enough of them are
doing so such that government functions.
When we say government succeeds, we are not denying that its
performance falls short of what is expected or needed. In particular, the
performance of regulatory agencies has deteriorated over the last dec109. GORMLEY & BALLA, supra note 106, at 47-48.
110. See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell &
Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (treating organizations as complex sub-cultures of norms).
111. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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ade.1 12 But government is not the train wreck that the economic perspective expects, and, based on a new book by one of the authors, we do not
see how government underperformance vindicates the economic perspective. Shapiro and his coauthor Rena Steinzor detail how regulatory
underperformance results from political oversight and judicial review,
rather than the shirking or sabotage of civil servants.H3 They argue that
the civil service should be credited with making the government work
despite the significant handicaps thrown in the path of agencies by the
White House, Congress, and the courts. 1 14
There are many potential reasons for agency underperformance,
and employee self-interest might also number among them. Moreover,
Steven Croley contends that when the grim predictions of the economic
model do not come true, it is primarily because outside-in controls manage to block self-interested bureaucratic behavior.I" Classic administrative law controls undoubtedly lead to such happy endings in some
instances. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to draw broad lessons from
confirmed examples of self-interested bureaucracy. The reasons for governmental failure are just as varied as the reasons for market failure, and
the best responses to these failures must remain flexible and responsive
to the situation.' 16
2.

THE PUBLIC'S EXPERIENCE
Many of us have had positive interactions with public employees.
As one public administration scholar notes, "[w]hether tax officials,
police officers, Customs employees, or agricultural inspectors, it is possible to encounter bureaucrats who work hard, show concern for our
interests, do not flaunt their authority, exhibit courtesy and good humor,
and go the extra mile to help out.""' According to polling data, one is
more likely to encounter these types of employees than not. When citizens are surveyed about their satisfaction with government services, the
government generally gets good marks at all levels."'
Consider, for example, a study by Thomas and Michelle Miller that
analyzed the results of 261 surveys conducted by local governments to
measure public satisfaction with their services.1 1 9 They calculated the
112. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
113. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 49, 97-146, 191.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 49, 191.
CROLEY, supra note 47, at 305-06.
Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
GOOODSELL, supra note 3, at 2.
See id. at 24-31 (describing the survey evidence and concluding that "[t]his does not

mean . . . that these experiences are never bad-only that most are good.").

119. Thomas I. Miller & Michelle A. Miller, Standards of Excellence: U.S. Residents'
Evaluations of Local Government Services, 51 Pus. ADMIN. REv. 503 (1991).
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average "percent to max (PTM)" score on the surveys at 67.2.120 A PTM
score measures the extent to which the responses collectively attained
the highest possible point on whatever rating scale was used. A score of
67.2 means that the average citizen indicated a rating of satisfaction with
local governmental services that was more than two-thirds of the way to
a perfect rating.
As the following chart indicates, the American Consumer Satisfaction Index reports the same generally high regard for the services provided by federal government. This survey is based on thirty-nine user
groups at twenty-four agencies. 12 1 The scores are consistent with prior
years. 12 2 The government's aggregate satisfaction score of 68.9 (out of
100) lags behind a national average score of 75.0 for the private sector, 123 but it is a respectable showing nonetheless. It is notable that those
polled express high levels of trust in specific agencies (an average score
of 70 out of 100), but low overall trust in the government (a score of
37). 124
Figure 4 Consumer Satisfaction Scores, Federal Government 2008125
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These results might be questioned on the ground that citizens do
not have enough in-depth knowledge about the quality of the services
120. Id. at 507.
121. See GOODSELL, supra note 3, at 29-30 (describing the ACSI methodology).
122. ACSI Commentary, Federal Government Scores, (Dec.16, 2008), http://www.theacsi.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=204&Itemid=62.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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that they are receiving, and the results may vary depending on the nature
of the question asked. But taking these qualifications into account, it is
notable that about two-thirds of citizens report a good experience dealing with federal bureaucrats.

3.

OBSERVED

EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR

Scholars regularly study public employees at work, paying particular attention to settings where self-interested behavior ought to thrive.
These studies of employee behavior offer additional evidence that many
civil servants do not behave as economic theory predicts. Even when the
studies find evidence of self-interest, it turns out that this does not result
in the shirking and sabotage that is supposed to occur.
John Brehm and Scott Gates studied employee behavior by comparing surveys of government and local employees that indicate how
employees view their own behavior and how it is viewed by their fellow
workers, supervisors, and outside persons.12 6 The data consistently
demonstrated that "bureaucrats devote the majority of their time to
working, rather than to shirking or to sabotage,"' and there was "no
evidence at all to support leisure-maximization as an explanation for
variance in [employee] effort" in different agencies and in different
surveys. 128 The surveys also revealed that federal employees are motivated by pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives, but that pecuniary
incentives are not strong enough to account for the lack of shirking and
sabotage.129 Since supervisors were highly constrained in punishing and
rewarding employees, the lack of shirking and sabotage is explained by
such non-pecuniary rewards as "recognition from others, accomplishing
worthwhile things, [and] serving the public interest . . . ."130
Marissa Golden studied employee behavior by considering how
upper-level civil servants in four agencies responded to the election of
Ronald Reagan.' 3 1 "Even under the most extreme circumstances, with a
president attempting to turn agency policy 180 degrees from its past,"
Golden found, "career civil servants were, for the most part, responsive
126. BREHM & GATES, supra note 93, at 198. The surveys were conducted by the Office of

Personnel Management and covered dozens of agencies, ranging from the military through human
services. Id. at 76. The authors also conducted surveys of a county Department of Social Services
and in three police departments. Id. at 112, 132.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 83; see also id. at 80-81, 195.

131. GOLDEN, supra note 95, at 33. The four agencies were the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) in the Department of

Agriculture, the Civil Rights Division (CRD) of the Department of Justice, and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). Id.
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to this change in elected leadership." 13 2 Although there were instances
of exit, voice, and sabotage, Golden concludes that "presidents can
expect a fairly high degree of responsiveness from the career bureaucrats
in the executive branch." 3 3 She attributes this behavior to both selfinterest and role perception.134 Although careerists were compliant to
avoid demotion or other punishments, 3 1 they also understood that their
role was to present information to their political appointees and to allow
them to determine whether and how to carry out the president's policy

preferences.

136

Golden's study gives more credit to supervisors' ability to punish
employees and to influence their behavior than do Brehm and Gates.137
But both studies agree that a combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives explain the behavior of civil servants. 13
In sum, the evidence of bureaucratic behavior suggests that selfinterested behavior and public-interested behavior exist side by side in
administrative agencies. The self-interested behavior does not crowd out
other employee conduct. Public-regarding behavior exists in the bureaucracies, and even persists in administrations hostile to an agency's mission. Thus, the effort to identify agencies that are most friendly to
public-regarding motives appears to be worthwhile.

IV.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY

The administrative presidency has dominated efforts to control the
bureaucracy for the last two decades. While there is a strong normative
case to be made for presidential efforts to oversee the bureaucracy, the
administrative presidency comes with a downside that has been largely
ignored: in some settings, it makes the agency less effective.
This section examines the relationship between the administrative
presidency and governmental effectiveness. We begin with a short history of the evolution of the administrative presidency, which reveals that
the White House devotes considerable time and resources attempting to
ensure its policy priorities are implemented. We then describe a conflict
between the administrative presidency and the effectiveness of
government.
132. Id. at 151-52.
133. Id. at 152.
134. Id. at 155, 158.
135. See id. at 158-59 (civil servants "feared for their jobs, wanted to avoid the wrath of their
appointed bosses, did not want to be demoted or banished, and sought to advance their careers.").
136. Id. at 155.
137. Compare GOLDEN, supra note 95, at 158-59, with BREnM & GATEs, supra note 93, at 42.
138. See BREHm & GATEs, supra note 93 at 82-83; GOLDEN, supra note 95, at 154-60 and

accompanying text.
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The Evolution

Every president since Richard Nixon has embraced the administrative presidency. Some presidents have been more enthusiastic practitioners of this effort than others, but no one, including President Obama, has
reversed the trend in a significant way. The growth in the administrative
presidency, therefore, has been entirely in the direction of more centralization, more political appointees, and more reporting requirements.
1.

RICHARD NIXON

Richard Nixon kicked off the administrative presidency by creating
the Domestic Council and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB),139 both of which started the White House on the road to centralized decisions. Worried that the staff of an agency would capture the
administrator, a result that a Nixon advisor (John Ehrlichman) described
as "marrying the natives," 4 0 Nixon also began the increased use of
political appointees. 141 The idea was that additional political appointees
would be in a better position to defend the administration's policy preferences because they would be less distant from the staff than the
administrator. 142
2.

JIMMY

CARTER

President Carter spearheaded the creation of the Senior Executive
Service (SES), which created a cadre of civil service employees who
work just below politically appointed managers. 14 3 Although this legislation was intended to improve the quality of top-level civil service managers, 1" there are two aspects of the SES that empower the
administrative presidency. First, although most SES managers rise up
from the civil service, the president is able to appoint up to 10 percent of
all SES managers and up to one quarter of SES managers in a single
agency.145 Second, administrators have the legal authority to move toplevel career civil service managers with whom they do not wish to
139. PATRICIA WALLACE INGRAHAM,
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 97 (1995).

THE

FOUNDATION

OF MERIT: PUBLIC SERVICE IN

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also DAVID E.

LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLMCAL
CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 52 (2008) (stating that Nixon, upset with appointees
and career officials from his first term, replaced them with layers of "loyalists," and "inserted

additional political appointees deep into the departments and bureaus, and tried to accomplish
informally what Congress would not allow formally in reorganization.").
143. INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 98.

144. Id. at 98-99.
145. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 913, 925-26 (2009).
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work. 146
The Carter administration also increased the number of Schedule C
appointees,' 4 7 a strategy that every president subsequently has used to
increase the number of employees responsive to him.' 4 8 Schedule C
appointments are Civil Service jobs that are not based on the results of
an examination process. 14 9 These jobs are exempt because the work is
confidential or involves the determination of government policy. 5 o
Between 1976 and 1990, the presidents doubled the number of Schedule
C appointments."5 '
3.

RONALD REAGAN

President Reagan adopted the first regulatory reporting requirements, including regulatory impact statements.152 The administration
also sought greater control by choosing presidential appointees on the
basis of their ideological affinity, rather than their expertise or experience, and by screening managers appointed by cabinet officers and
administrators on the same basis, rather than permitting the top appoinThe administration also
tees to make these choices themselves.'
increased the number of Schedule C political appointees in departments,
such as the Department of Labor, that were perceived as hostile to the
President's policy priorities.154 In addition, the Reagan administration
used internal agency reorganizations, program reductions, and employment cuts.15 5 These cuts were known as "reductions-in-force," and
according to David Lewis, "had much the same effect as more overt
politicization or reorganization in some circumstances since it altered
the career-appointee balance in many agencies." 15 6
146. INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 98-99.
147. Id. at 99.
148. See LEWIS, supra note 142, at 11.
149. See O'Connell, supra note 145, at 925-26 (explaining the categories of civil service
employees exempted from the examination process).
150. Id.
151. INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 9.
152. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), required agencies to assess the costs and
benefits of proposed rules, and it prohibited agencies from proposing or finalizing rules until their
cost-benefit analyses were approved by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),
located in the OMB. The administration also required agencies to submit an annual regulatory
agenda, Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), and to assess family, federalism, property
rights, and trade impacts. See Exec. Order No. 12,261, 3 C.F.R. 83 (1981); Exec. Order No.
12,606, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1987); Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987); Exec. Order No.
12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988).
153. Shapiro, supra note 24, at 5.
154. INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 101.
155. LEWIs, supra note 142, at 52.
156. Id.
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BUSH

The first President Bush engaged in less intensive efforts to manage
the bureaucracy, perhaps because "he had a much less clear policy
agenda and less need for a tightly controlled political management
machine,"'- 7 but he made his own additions to the administrative presidency. These included additional reporting requirements, more political
appointees in departments of special concern to him (through additional
Schedule C appointments), 5 8 and the imposition of a 180-day regulatory
moratorium toward the end of his term.'5 9
5.

BILL CLINTON

President Clinton continued the use of regulatory impact analysis
and other reporting requirements,' 60 which gave these tools a bipartisan
pedigree. Large numbers of political appointees also remained a component of the Clinton management strategy. 16 ' The significant difference
from the prior administration was the president's personal involvement
in rulemaking. He intervened at the front end of the process by issuing a
formal directive to an agent head that indicated the type of regulation
that the president wanted.162 At the back end, President Clinton took
credit for the regulation by announcing its promulgation, a strategy
intended to affect the prior stages of the rulemaking and to ensure compliance with the president's preferences. 163
Other members of his staff were also actively involved in steering
regulatory policy, as Professors Lisa Bressman and Michael
Vandenbergh have demonstrated.&I Based on a survey of EPA officials
appointed during the first Bush (1989-1993) and Clinton (1993-2001)
Administrations, they found that as many as nineteen White House
offices were involved in reviewing EPA rules,165 with as many as
157. INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 102.
158. Id. at 102-03.
159. Shapiro, supra note 24, at 8.
160. President Clinton replaced Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, issued by President
Reagan, with Executive Order 12,866; but the new order, while providing for greater transparency
and less delay, adopted the prior systems of review. See 3 C.F.R. 638, 640, 645 (1993), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). President Clinton also imposed additional impact assessment
requirements for federalism, environmental justice, and impacts on state, local and Native
American governments. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999) (federalism); Exec. Order
No. 12,988, 3 CFR 157 (1996) (civil justice); Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669 (1993)
(intergovernmental entities).
161. INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 103.
162. Kagan, supra note 26, at 2249.
163. Id.
164. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006).
165. Id. at 68.
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ninety-three percent of the respondents explaining that they became
involved in debates with institutional entities other than the OMB. 166

6.

GEORGE

W.

BUSH

George W. Bush adopted the Clinton executive order on regulatory
review and, later in the administration, made two changes to it. The
administration included non-legislative rules within the scope of the
order and required that the policy officer who served as the gatekeeper
for agency rulemaking be a presidential appointee. 16 7 There was also a
return to using a political compatibility test for agency appointees. 1 68 As
well, Vice President Cheney was notorious for intervening in bureaucratic decisions without, as the Washington Post put it, "leaving any

tracks."

69

The administration's unique contribution was its claim that the
administrative presidency was constitutionally compelled by the "unitary executive" interpretation of the Constitution. In President Bush's
understanding, "Congress evidently cannot delegate authority to a
subordinate executive branch official without formally allowing the
president to substitute his own views for those of the officer."o7 0 The
Clinton administration made a similar claim about the president's
authority to order changes, but claimed only that Congress had in effect
delegated this power to the president, without grounding the claim in the
Constitution.17 1
166. Id. at 66.
167. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2007).
168. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Political Control of FederalProsecutions:Looking Back and

Looking Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. 2087, 2102 (2009) (describing the practice of the George W.
Bush administration of choosing Justice Department appointees using a political compatibility
test).
169. See Jo Becker and Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST (June 27, 2007),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/leaving-no-tracks/; see, e.g., STEINZOR &
SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 128, 144 (explaining how the Vice-President and the White House
ended up writing EPA regulations controlling emissions from electrical generation plants under
the Clean Air Act).
170. Harold J. Krent, The Sometimes Unitary Executive: Presidential Practice Throughout
History, 25 CONsT. COMMENT. 489, 504 (2009) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI &
CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO

BUSH (2008)). Because the president is authorized by the Constitution to "take Care" that federal
laws are "faithfully executed," the most aggressive view of the unitary executive concludes that
the President has the "duty" and therefore the power to direct agency heads, and if necessary, to
correct their decisions. See Farina,supra note 34, at 358 (describing the aggressive viewpoint). A
less aggressive version maintains that the President has the power to fire any administrator who
does not make a decision the president prefers, although the president lacks the authority to
overrule that decision. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive from Those
Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi &
Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 597-98 (2010).

171. See Kagan, supra note 26, at 2320 (contending that President Clinton's practices were
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BARACK OBAMA

President Obama inherited and continued the administrative presidency. There are now about 1800 people in the Executive Office of the
President (EOP) who help him manage the federal bureaucracy. 72 The
EOP, which has a budget of $439 million, consists of thirteen major
offices, board, and councils, and their sub-units, the most significant of
which is probably the OMB, which employs about 500 people and is
composed of career employees and political appointees. 173 President
Obama has selected about the same number of policy czars (34) as the
prior administration employed (36),1' and, as far as we can tell, he has
kept at least the same number of political appointees. There has been no
reduction in the reporting requirements created by his predecessors.17 5
As in the Clinton administration, presidential oversight has been
friendlier to agency preferences,17 6 but this does not signal a cutback in
the administrative presidency. If a president is less hostile to regulation,
there is less need for the White House to dampen agency enthusiasm.
Nevertheless, the Obama White House has not hesitated to head off
strong regulation when it sees a political benefit in doing so. 177
B.

The Consequences

The White House deploys a large internal bureaucracy, thousands
of political appointees, and an extensive regulatory reporting system to
promote the bureaucracy's responsiveness to the president's policy preferences. More attention has been paid to how these tools can promote
overhead democracy than to its internal effects on the bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, the effects are not necessarily positive. While the bureaucracy may become more responsive to the president's policy preferbased on a statutory interpretation argument that where statutes grant discretion to executive
branch, ultimate decision-making authority has been left by Congress in the hands of the
President).
172. Farina, supra note 34, at 405.
173. Id. at 405-06.
174. See Michael A. Fletcher & Brady Dennis, Obama's Many Policy "Czars" Draw Ire From
Conservatives, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2009/09/15/AR2009091501424.html?sid=ST2009091501436 (noting that President Bush
had 36 policy czars and President Obama has 34).
175. President Obama did revoke President Bush's executive order extending regulatory
review to non-legislative rules, Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009), but
the administration has apparently continued such review nevertheless. See Letter to Robert Bauer,
White House Council, from CPR Board Members (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.progressive
reform.org/articles/WHCounsel re_-OIRAMarch2010.pdf
176. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 145.
177. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Organizational Perspective, 18

N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (describing White House efforts to change EPA's
proposed rule concerning coal ash to please the electrical generation industry).
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ences, government is also less effective in carrying out its statutory
mandates.
This tension between responsiveness and effectiveness arises for
several reasons. The need to fill thousands of positions with political
appointees results in a high level of vacancies, denying agencies consistent on-going management. Administrations also face a challenge in
appointing competent managers in all of these positions, particularly if
they use political ideology as a qualification. Another problem is that
multiple layers of review delay and distort decision-making. By dragging down the effectiveness of agencies, the administrative presidency
contributes to the deterioration of the civil service. Experienced civil
servants leave because their agencies become dysfunctional, and it is
difficult to recruit talented replacements for the same reason. Finally, the
administrative presidency deflects attention from the fundamental
problems that inhibit effective government. The White House spends too
much time focusing on the minutia of individual policy initiatives and
too little time on the big picture of whether agencies can implement their
statutory missions.
1.

VACANCIES

A new administration has to fill many positions. One estimate is
that a change in the party controlling the White House can result in 1400
new political appointments,"' but this may be too low. Senate-confirmed appointees, non-civil service SES employees, and politicallyselected Schedule C employees hold about 3000 or more jobs in the
federal bureaucracy.17 9 Even if an administration chooses not to fill all
of the SES and Schedule C jobs with political appointees, it will still
have a substantial task.
With so many jobs to fill, it takes a new administration considerable time to get the first appointees into place.1 s0 When Anne Joseph
O'Connell studied vacancies that occurred in the past five completed
administrations, she found that the average time it took to fill a Senateconfirmed agency position in the executive branch ranged from 163 days
(first Bush administration) to 267 days (Clinton administration).'
While presidents tend to fill the highest positions fairly quickly, lower
positions take far longer.18 2 The delay for one category of such posi178. James W. Fesler, The Higher Civil Service in Europe and the United States, in THE
HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE IN EUROPE AND CANADA 87, 88 (Bruce L.R. Smith ed., 1984).

179. LEWIs, supra note 142, at 56; INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 104; Farina, supra note 34, at
410.
180. O'Connell, supra note 145, at 918-19.
181. Id. at 956, Table 1.

182. Id. at 957, Table 2.
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tions, for example, ranged from 283 days (first Bush administration) to
420 days (Reagan administration).1 83
The situation has not improved in the Obama administration. At the
start of its second year, the administration lagged behind all four previous administrations in percentage of Senate-confirmed executive
appointments and key positions remaining open.18 1 It has filled 64.4% of
these positions as compared to 86.4% for the Reagan administration,
80.1% for the George H.W. Bush administration, 73.8% for the George
W. Bush administration, and 69.8% for the Clinton administration.18 5
Moreover, because of turnover among political appointees, an
administration must fill these jobs again in a year or two.18 6 Many political appointees leave near the end of an administration, leaving the jobs
vacant again.18 The National Commission on the Public Service found
that the average amount of time that political appointees stayed in office
declined from 2.8 years in the Johnson administration to two years in
1984 in the Reagan administration, and that forty percent of government
executives stayed in their positions less than one year.'18 The tenure for
Schedule C appointments was the shortest.18 9 Moreover, the reappointment process can take months once a position becomes open. As a result
of turnover and delays in filling positions, Professor O'Connell found
that Senate-confirmed positions in executive agencies were vacant an
average of twenty-five percent of the time during the past five
administrations. 190
The problem of turnover and vacancies produces two significant
performance problems. The first is inaction. Agencies that lack key managers are less likely to address pressing important problems or to provide the guidance necessary for lower level employees to begin the
work."' The National Highway Traffic Administration, for example,
faced the problem of runaway Toyota cars for a year without an administrator, a vacancy that a former head of NHTSA believes hindered the
183. Id.
184. ANNE JOSEPH O'CONNELL, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, WAITING FOR LEADERSHIP:
PRESIDENT OBAMA's RECORD IN STAFFING KEY AGENCY POSITIONS AND How To IMPROVE THE

APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 2 (2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww

ap

pointments.pdf.
185. Id.
186. O'Connell, supra note 145, at 919.
187. Id.
188. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., Politics and Performance: Strengthening the
Executive Leadership System, in LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC SERVICE

219, 220 (1990).
189. INGRAHAM, supra note 139, at 105.
190. O'Connell, supra note 145, at 962.

191. Id. at 938.
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agency's response. 192 Moreover, without stability in management, civil
servants are reluctant to invest the time to develop new policies and
programs. 193 If the manager who approved the initiative leaves the
agency, employees anticipate that the next manager may not favor the
proposed policy.
Confusion is another result. When managerial positions remain
vacant, the career staff lacks direction about what they should do. While
the staff has expertise, such as law or science, these skills are meaningless without directions on which of the agency's priorities to emphasize.1 94 Consider, for example, FEMA's disastrous performance in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf
Coast, more than one-third of FEMA's key management positions were
vacant.195 Likewise, it is difficult to develop new policies, such as a
regulation, unless managers are present to ensure that the policy reflects
options that the agency leadership can support.' 96

2.

COMPETENCE

As the administrative presidency has evolved, the number of politically appointed officials has increased. This not only results in positions
being frequently vacant, it presents a challenge in terms of appointing
competent managers.
Because of frequent turnover, political appointees often do not have
time to learn enough about their agencies to become effective managers.
Consider David Lewis's study of agency performance in the George W.
Bush administration. Lewis focused on the Program Assessment Rating
Tool (PART), a numerical grade devised by the OMB to assess agency
performance. Lewis found that programs managed by political appointees consistently received lower PART scores than programs headed by
career employees.' So did programs that employed a higher percentage
of political appointees. 98 According to Lewis's statistical evaluation,
previous experience in a program and longer tenure in a manager's job
were the systematic factors that explained the differences in the PART
scores.' 99
192. O'CONNELL, supra note 184, at 3.
193. O'Connell, supra note 145, at 962.
194. Id. at 941.
195. Id. at 939-40; see also LEWIS, supra note 142, at 150 (stating that FEMA has consistently
had a problem with vacancies, and noting that "[t]here was rarely a time when at least one of the
important appointed posts was not vacant.").
196. O'CONNELL, supra note 184, at 11.
197. LEWIS, supra note 142, at 172-84.
198. Id. at 183.
199. Id. at 189.
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Lewis also found that programs managed by political appointees
also scored lower on another measure of program performance
employed by the Bush administration, the Federal Human Capital Survey, which asks government employees whether the characteristics of
successful organizations were present in their agency. 200 Programs run
by political appointees received consistently lower ratings concerning
management, leadership, and work environment than programs run by
career staff managers.2 0 1
A White House that appoints on the basis of ideological loyalty can
make the problem of competence worse. Appointees who have little
experience in management and scant respect for professional bureaucrats
are more likely to demean and ignore the advice of the career staff. They
are therefore more likely to repeat historical mistakes and make serious
errors in judgment in both framing and choosing policy options.2 0 2 The
results can be disastrous, as Michael Brown's performance as head of
FEMA during Katrina demonstrated.20 3
The emphasis on appointing managers on the basis of ideological
loyalty can also lead managers to ignore or demean legitimate scientific
evidence, as the Bush administration's treatment of agency science
revealed. Agency administrators routinely ignored the scientific evidence presented to them, changed scientific reports to conform to their
policy preferences, and barred agency scientists from participating in
scientific meetings or publishing relevant research.2

04

200. Id. at 189-94.
201. Id.
202. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 198.
203. Id.; see also LEWIS, supra note 142, at 165-69. Lewis states that evaluations of FEMA's
performance during Katrina:
look strikingly like those that followed Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Critiques
focused on unclear responsibilities and lines of authority during catastrophic events;
confusion about when the federal government can and should supersede state
authority; insufficient planning, training programs, and predisaster exercises;
inadequate response and recovery capabilities; and a failure in executive leadership.
Id. at 166. Brown was also roundly criticized for waiting five hours after Katrina's landfall to call
in disaster-response teams, and only pre-positioning one FEMA official in New Orleans before
landfall. Id. at 167-69. Lewis asserts Brown's unresponsive, unprepared nature likely resulted
from his lack of disaster experience. Id.
204. See, e.g., DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT Is THEIR PRODUCr: How INDUSTRY'S ASSAULT ON
SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 192-211 (2008); THOMAS 0. McGARTY & WENDY E.
WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE, How SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH
125-26, 184-88 (2008); SETH SHULMAN, UNDERMINING SCIENCE: SUPPRESSION AND DISTORTION
IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006); RESCUING SCIENCE FROM PoLrrICs: REGULATION AND THE
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006); CHRIS
MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 221-47 (2005); Linda Greer & Rena Steinzor, Bad

Science, 19

ENvTL.

F. 28 (2002).
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DELAY

The centralization of decision-making in the White House and the
deployment of political appointees deep into the bureaucracy create multiple layers of review for policy proposals. The result, which Paul Light
describes as the "thickening" of government,20 5 slows agency decisionmaking. An issue stops at many levels of review, however briefly.20 6
In the Reagan administration, OIRA was a significant source of
delay. 207 Although OIRA review has been less time-consuming since the
Clinton administration introduced time deadlines,2 08 most analysts still
point to reporting requirements as a source of rulemaking ossification.
As two observers note:
It is difficult to measure the costs of delay caused by ossification and
impossible to prove that these costs are outweighed by improvements
in the regulations that are adopted. We can say with some assurance,
however, that even when Congress instructs the EPA to complete a
regulation within a certain time frame, those deadlines are rarely
met. 209
There are other causes of delay, of course, but there is little doubt
that the administrative presidency contributes to the problem.

4.

DISTORTION

Multiple layers of review distort decision-making. For one thing,
the review process impedes the flow of information up and down the
management chain. Information can become distorted as it passes from
one level to another, and some important information may never make it
all the way to top officials. 2 10 The same problem exists for guidance and
oversight that must pass back down through layer after layer before it
reaches front-line employees. Information is lost because it often passes
by word of mouth, much like the children's game of telephone.2 11
Cynthia Farina sums up the consequences this way: "Even under the
most optimistic assumptions of universal, disinterested competence and
good judgment, the information flowing up to the President about implications and options will be imperfect-and the message flowing down
205.
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LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFusIoN OF

ACCOUNTABILTY 85-86 (1995).

206. Id. at 79-85.
207. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1280-81 (2006) (describing how delay was "OIRA's tactic of choice for
stifling costly new regulations" during the Reagan and first Bush administrations).
208. Id. at 1281.
209. STEINZOR & SHAPIRo, supra note 4, at 141-42.
210. LIGHT, supra note 205, at 65-66.
211. Id.; see also David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law
in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1095, 1128 (2008).
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to agency officials about 'what the President wants done' will at times
be ambiguous, even contradictory."2 12
Layers of review also distort decision-making by making it less
systematic. White House involvement in decision-making focuses on the
subset of relevant issues that have the most political salience. Rather
than systematically monitoring agencies, White House officials react to
the views of interest groups, influential constituents, and the media. 2 1 3 In
addition, White House officials seldom have the same awareness of the
issue and its relationship to other issues as agency administrators who
have overseen the development of a rule; they are not attuned to the
advice of the career staff or to the rulemaking record.2 14 While an
agency is normally allowed to defend its preferred resolution of an issue,
no agency will be granted enough time to make reviewers on the outside
as fully informed as the agency insiders.
White House review is not systematic even within the context of
OIRA review of regulatory impact statements. According to the respondents in the Bressman-Vanderbergh study, OIRA involvement was "sporadic;" it was "very involved in the things they got involved in [but] they
let most of it go by," and OIRA had "heavy involvement in some
rulemakings but hardly any or none in plenty of other rulemakings."2 1 5
Those surveyed attributed the intensity or lack of intensity of review to
the professional or political interests of particular OIRA staffers.2 16
Thus, White House oversight is "sporadic, at times cacophonous,
and often imperfectly realized."21 7 Even if White House oversight promotes accountability, it may not "promote rationality in a systematic
way, as a model of agency decision-making should."2 18
5.

DETERIORATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

The previous problems have an adverse impact on the civil service,
making it more difficult to hire and retain effective employees. As we
discussed earlier, a primary motivation for the career bureaucracy is the
opportunity to promote the agency's mission. In particular, many senior
officials report that the satisfaction that comes from promoting the public interest is more important to them than the financial rewards they
212. Farina, supra note 34, at 413-14.
213. In political science terminology, the White House practices "fire-alarm" oversight instead
of engaging in the more systematic "police-patrol" oversight. See Farina,supra note 34, at 412-13
(discussing the White House reliance on "fire-alarm" oversight).
214. STEINZOR & SHAPimo, supra note 4, at 132.
215. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 164, at 67.

216. Id. at 70.
217. Farina, supra note 34, at 412.
218. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 164, at 70.
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earn from their jobs. Civil service jobs therefore are less attractive when
the previous problems make agencies less effective, as the National
Commission on Public Service explains:
There are too many decision makers, too much central clearance, too
many bases to touch, and too many overseers with conflicting agendas. Leadership responsibilities often fall into the awkward gap
between inexperienced political appointees and unsupported career
managers. . . . Policy change has become so difficult that federal

employees themselves often come to share the cynicism about government that affects many of our citizens.21 9
As a result, the Commission notes, "[t]oo many of the most talented
leave the public service too early; too many of the least talented stay too
long."22 0
The administrative presidency has another unfortunate impact on
the civil service. In defense of their aggregation of power, presidents
have routinely bashed the bureaucracy. Ronald Reagan and George W.
Bush used this rhetoric most aggressively, but Democrats also follow
this path. 2 Some of this criticism is no doubt deserved, although earlier
we noted that the government generally performs far better than this
rhetoric would indicate. 2 2 2 From the point of view of the civil service,
the practitioners of bureaucracy bashing are not only over the top in their
rhetoric, they blame the bureaucracy for government failures that result
from complex causes, including poor presidential administration. Moreover, any job is less attractive when the boss regularly and publicly stigmatizes the employees, and seldom praises their good work.
To be sure, the disillusionment of the career civil service has many
causes, including pay rates and working conditions.2 23 The loss of talented civil servants, however, is a problem for the country no matter
what the cause. As one of the authors has explained:
. . . the federal government will lose nearly 530,000 employees,
largely because it has a workforce aging far faster than that of the
private sector-58 percent of federal workers are over 45, compared
with 41 percent in the private sector . . . . The attrition will cripple
the government at the highest levels . . . 36 percent of the SES

employees will retire by 2012.... Similarly, 27 percent of supervi219. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2003).

220. Id.
221. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 126.
222. See supra Section m.C.I.
223. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 216-18; see also LEWis, supra note 142, at 141-42
(discussing the theory that competent workers will choose salary structures directly tied to
performance, and thus "the best workers will choose the private sector over government work
because the private sector is more likely to reward them for their performance.").
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sors who direct daily work throughout the government are expected
to retire by 2012.224
The loss of talented federal employees not only limits the government's capacity to complete the missions that Congress assigns, it also
adversely affects the capacity of the bureaucracy to check the administrative presidency. When agency professionals, operating within the
parameters of their training and experience, present their understanding
of the law, science, and technology to agency leadership, they speak
truth to power. When this capacity is reduced, politics takes on a greater
role in influencing the outcome. Agencies should not, and cannot as a
practical matter, ignore the White House's policy demands. But, without
an effective civil service, an agency loses its capacity to vet the validity
of these policy demands.

6.

MISPLACED ATTENTION

Since the goal of the administrative presidency is to strengthen the
responsiveness of the bureaucracy to the White House's policy preferences, it does not take note of forces that weaken the agency's capacity
more generally. White House officials have mostly sat on their hands as
the capacity of agencies to protect the public has gradually eroded.
In a recent book, one of the authors details how the five agencies
primarily responsible for protecting the health and safety of the public
are in shambles. 2 2 5 These agencies-the Consumer Protection Safety
Commission (CPSC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Occupational Safety Administration
(OSHA)-have been unable to cope with both highly publicized threats
or systematic failures that threaten the public safety and health. The
book explains:
Two [agencies]-the CPSC and OSHA-would not make it past any
reasonable triage of effective institutions, just managing to stay open
for limited business. At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the EPA
... [which] has managed to cut a wider and deeper swath through
public affairs than the other agencies combined and [which] has been
brought to its knees only with considerable effort. In between . .. are
the NHTSA and the FDA, which have clocked substantial achievements at the same time that emerging, important problems slip from
their grasp.22 6
While the regulatory authority, resources, and capacity of these
224. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 208.
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agencies has diminished to an alarming point, the White House has been
more concerned about the minutiae of individual regulatory initiatives.
Rather than facilitating the work of government, the orientation of the
administrative presidency is to second-guess individual policy initiatives. As the White House fiddles with micro-management of the regulatory state, administrative government burns out.

V. THE PATH TO

STRONGER INSIDE-OUT CONTROLS

The administrative presidency has dominated efforts to control the
bureaucracy for the last two decades. The assumptions on which it is
based-the normative justification for overhead democracy and the economic perspective on bureaucratic behavior-are widely accepted in the
administrative law literature. But, as we have seen, the economic perspective is unduly suspicious of civil servants.2 27 Administrative law
fails to account for their other-regarding motivations, particularly professionalism, or the internal controls that address the self-interested
behavior of the career staff. Likewise, although little attention has been
paid to how the administrative presidency reduces government effectiveness, we know it hinders the capacity of the civil service to implement
the statutes under which they operate.2 28
Many conclude that, despite the weaknesses of the administrative
presidency in promoting overhead democracy, these techniques offer the
best available way to achieve democratic accountability. While this conclusion may hold true in the context of outside-in controls, it is the
wrong question to ask. Once it is recognized that inside-out controls also
play a role in promoting democratic accountability, the question
becomes this: What is the best mix of outside-in and inside-out controls?
When inside-out controls work, there is less need for outside-in controls
to promote democratic accountability, making it possible to reduce the
toxic side effects of the administrative presidency.
In assessing the administrative presidency, we must remember that
agency effectiveness itself is a form of democratic responsiveness.
When Congress passes and the president signs legislation, the failure to
achieve these commitments devalues the democratic processes that produced the legislation and the commitments made in those laws. Agencies must be responsive both to the values of the elected Congress that
passed the statute and to the current policy preferences of the elected
president.
Yet, half of the task of democratic responsiveness-the congres227. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Section I.B.
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sional half-has largely been ignored because of the focus on the
administrative presidency and its efforts to make the bureaucracy more
responsive to the president's policy preferences. Support for the administrative presidency is based largely on its normative premises with little
regard for its impact on governance in its totality.2 29 As Hugh Heclo
once noted, "[i]n practice the idea that the higher career service should
be a resource for political leadership is still alien to Washington."23 0
The price for this ignorance appears to us to be significant. While
we cannot prove that the benefits of the administrative presidency (an
increase in responsiveness) outweigh its costs (a loss of effectiveness),
we are confident that the administrative presidency is a significant contributing cause of government ineffectiveness. Moreover, ineffectiveness
begets more ineffectiveness. As the government becomes less effective,
the morale of the career staff suffers, producing a brain drain that further
threatens government effectiveness.
As the quality of the civil service falls, the country loses the most
valuable asset of a high quality civil service-its capacity to speak truth
to power. This was the Progressives' most useful insight: neutral competence is an antidote to the politicization of administration. Presidents are
no doubt frustrated by the bureaucracy's attention to evidence and reasoned argument, particularly when they wish to implement what they
perceive as their electoral mandate immediately and without opposition.
Yet the country is well served by the professional disciplines of the civil
service.
Hopefully, these considerations will at some point move Congress
to investigate the links between government effectiveness and the
administrative presidency. If, as the public administration literature suggests, the career civil service can at times be responsive and responsible
without the spur of the administrative presidency, then Congress and the
president may want to negotiate appropriate reductions in the administrative presidency.
The general assumption is that presidents are unlikely to cooperate
with reforms that reduce their power.2 3 1 While we are not pollyannas
about reform, we do not believe that future presidents, or even the current one, would resist all reform efforts. The effectiveness of government is a concern for presidents. Both progressive and conservative
presidents have some positive goals for government, if for no other rea229. SULEIMAN, supra note 2, at 219.
230. HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE PoLrIcs INWASHINGTON 241
(1977).
231. Cf. O'Connell, supra note 145, at 987-88 (concluding that achieving a reduction in the
number of political appointees is "politically impossible").
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son than to meet voter expectations about government protections and
services.
We suggest that the focus of Congress's efforts should be to reduce
the number of political appointees, a recommendation made by the
National Commission on Public Service 2 3 2 and endorsed by academics
who have studied the downsides of appointing over 3000 appointees.23 3
This appears to be a sensible reform since our own analysis indicates
that many of the problems with the administrative presidency are linked
to the multiple layers of review that it creates.
We do not favor, however, an across-the-board reduction in the
number of political appointees. Instead, we believe that the balance
between outside-in and inside-out controls should be based on an assessment of how well inside-out controls work for a given agency. As we
have suggested in Section II, the efficacy of hierarchical controls in an
agency is a function of the degree of discretion delegated to government
employees and the extent to which their actions can be monitored. Professionalism can make up for weaknesses in managerial controls, suggesting for example that the lawyers, scientists, public administrators,
and economists engaged in rulemaking will act in a responsive and
responsible manner.
Congress should therefore commission a study of what existing evidence tells us about the efficacy of managerial controls and professionalism in contexts like rulemaking. The newly reformed Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS), the National Academy of Public Administration, or perhaps both together, are good candidates for this
job.
V.

CONCLUSION

The nation has four ways to promote democratic accountability in
agencies, yet the administrative presidency has been the preferred strat-

egy for some time now. The proponents of the administrative presidency
not only overlook the efficacy of managerial and professional accountability, they have created a system of oversight that reduces the impact of
these alternative sources of accountability. As a result, shrinking the
administrative presidency does not necessarily mean a net loss of democratic accountability.
Government effectiveness can be rebuilt if Congress and the White
House recognize and rely to a greater extent on internal accountability
232. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC
SERVICE 7 (1989).
233. See, e.g, PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 164 (2007); David Fontana,
Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L. J. 548, 611 (2009).

620

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:577

mechanisms. State governments can also experiment with a variety of
controls. Scholars of administrative law can help to set the stage for this
development by recognizing the potential of inside-out controls for
establishing effective and accountable government.

